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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.

Case No. 990753-CA

ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR,

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty to one
count of possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with
intent to distribute, a third degree felony.

This Court has

jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2) (e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Was defendant seized within the meaning of the Fourth

Amendment when he answered questions posed by an officer after
the officer had stopped defendant's vehicle, issued a warning
citation, and returned his documentation without any conduct
indicating that defendant was not free to go?
Whether a defendant is constitutionally seized presents a
question of law, reviewed nondeferentially for correctness, but
with a "measure of discretion to the trial judge/'

State v.

Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994).
2.

Does defendant's attenuation analysis apply to a consent

to search given during a consensual encounter with no prior
police illegality?
Whether a principle of law applies to a given set of facts
presents a legal question, reviewed for correctness.

Wilde v.

Wilde, 969 P.2d 438, 442 (Utah App. 1998).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
U.S. Const, amend. IV.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
After a Utah Highway Patrol officer discovered close to nine
pounds of marijuana in the car defendant was driving, defendant
was charged with one count of possession of a controlled
substance with intent to distribute (R. 1). Defendant filed a
motion to suppress the evidence (R. 8). Following a preliminary
hearing, the magistrate bound defendant over for trial and
accepted his plea of not guilty (R. 9, 39: 13). Based on the
evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing, the court denied
2

defendant's suppression motion (R. 11-14 or addendum A ) .
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea, and the court
sentenced him to zero-to-five years in the Utah State Prison (R.
15-22, 28-29).

This timely appeal followed (R. 30-31).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Utah Highway Patrol trooper Steve Salas was patrolling along
1-70 when he saw defendant approach from the opposite direction
in a red 1999 Pontiac Grand Am with no front license plate (R.
39: 3-4). As the car passed by, Salas saw that the vehicle bore
a Nevada rear plate.

Knowing that Nevada required front plates,

Officer Salas effectuated a traffic stop (Id.).
As Officer Salas approached the stopped vehicle, he noticed
a two inch square, white velvet bag on the back dashboard.

He

then noticed another such bag hanging from the front mirror (Id.
at 4). When defendant rolled down his window, Salas "noticed a
fragrance, strong odor [sic] coming from the vehicle, like a
perfume or air freshener, something of that sort" (Id.).

When

Officer Salas told defendant about the missing license plate,
defendant immediately wanted to see where it should have been.
The pair walked to the front of the car, where defendant
suggested that "it may have fallen off or somebody may have
stolen the plate" (Id.).

The officer then asked defendant to get

back into the vehicle (Id. at 5). Officer Salas noticed that
defendant had a pager attached to his belt (Id. at 6).

3

Officer Salas then asked defendant for his driver's license,
registration, and insurance certificate (Id.).

When Salas saw

that defendant had a Massachusetts driver's license, he asked if
defendant had purchased the car in Nevada.
that he had rented the vehicle in Nevada.

Defendant answered
In response to further

inquiries, defendant told the officer that he was on business in
Nevada and that he was in computer sales.

Officer Salas

testified that he "asked him what kind of computers did he sell
and he told me Microsoft and stuff like that" (Id.).

Salas

elaborated: "When that was his response[,] that struck me kind of
funny since Microsoft isn't a computer, it's a software.

I had

to ask people that question before [sic] and they're detailed in
the type of computers that they sell.

They usually know what

they sell" (JdJ .
Officer Salas returned to his vehicle, ran a license and
warrants check, and found everything in order (Id.).

He then

wrote out a warning for the missing front license plate, walked
back to defendant's car, and returned all of defendant's
documentation (Id. at 6).
After the officer had issued the warning citation and
returned all of defendant's papers, he asked defendant more
questions, and defendant answered them (Id. at 6-7). Ultimately,
the officer asked for consent to search the vehicle, which
defendant granted (Id. at 7).

In searching a black bag located

4

in the trunk, Officer Salas found a gift-wrapped package, which
defendant gave him permission to open (Id. at 8). Inside was
approximately nine pounds of marijuana (Id. at 8, 9).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant first argues that the officer exceeded the
constitutional scope of the traffic stop by questioning him on
matters unrelated to the stop, after a warrants and license check
had come back clean and after the officer had issued a warning
citation.

This argument fails because, when the officer issued

the warning citation and returned defendant's documentation
without any coercive show of authority, the seizure prompted by
the original traffic stop de-escalated into a consensual
encounter.

Any further conversation between the two, therefore,

was not subject to the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Defendant next contends that his consent to search was
invalid because it was the product of an illegal police detention
and was not attenuated from it.

However, because the seizure

ended when the officer returned defendant's documents, the
subsequent conversation, which included defendant's consent to
search, was consensual in nature.

Consequently, because there

was no police illegality, there was nothing from which to
attenuate defendant's consent.

5

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
AFTER THE OFFICER COMPLETED THE PURPOSE OF
THE TRAFFIC STOP BY ISSUING A WARNING
CITATION AND RETURNING DEFENDANT'S DOCUMENTS
WITHOUT ANY COERCIVE SHOW OF AUTHORITY,
DEFENDANT WAS NO LONGER SEIZED FOR FOURTH
AMENDMENT PURPOSES; CONSEQUENTLY, THE
SUBSEQUENT EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE TWO WAS
CONSENSUAL AS A MATTER OF LAW
Defendant argues that Officer Salas exceeded the permissible
scope of the traffic stop and thus violated his Fourth Amendment
right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure when,
after issuing a warning citation and without articulable
suspicion of other wrongdoing, he questioned defendant about
matters unrelated to his missing front license plate (Br. of App.
at 7-8). Consequently, defendant asserts that the marijuana
ultimately seized by the officer should have been suppressed (Id.
at 6, 14) .
The trial court, in denying defendant's suppression motion,
determined that after the officer checked defendant's driver's
license, four factors provided reasonable suspicion to continue
the detention.

The trial court cited the following factors as

supportive of the officer's reasonable suspicion: 1) the driver,
not from Nevada, was driving a Nevada rental car; 2) the driver
said he sold Microsoft computers; 3) the officer saw white velvet
bags on the rear dash and front mirror; and 4) the vehicle
smelled strongly of air freshener or perfume (R. 12 or addendum
6

A).
In the State's view, the dispositive inquiry is not whether
Officer Salas had sufficient reasonable suspicion of further
criminal activity to justify expanding the scope of the stop or
continuing the detention.1

Rather, the case analytically turns

on the point in time at which defendant was no longer seized for
Fourth Amendment purposes.

At that juncture, the interchange

between defendant and the officer became consensual in nature and
thus beyond the ambit of the Fourth Amendment.

The trial court's

denial of defendant's suppression motion should be sustained on
this analytically sound alternative ground.

See Debrv v. Noble,

889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995)(affirming on alternative grounds);
State v. S.V.. 906 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah App. 1995) (same).
Not every encounter between the police and a citizen
constitutes a seizure within the Fourth Amendment.

Indeed, both

federal and state courts have recognized three categories of
constitutionally permitted police-citizen encounters:
(l)an officer may approach a citizen at
anytime [sic] and pose questions so long as
the citizen is not detained against his will;
(2) an officer may seize a person if the
officer has an * articulable suspicion" that

1

The officer's initial detention must, of course, also be
"justified at its inception." Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20
(1968) . In this case, however, defendant raised neither the
propriety of the initial stop before the trial court nor plain
error or exceptional circumstances on appeal. Consequently, the
propriety of the initial stop is not at issue here. State v.
Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 363 (Utah App. 1993).
7

the person has committed or is about to
commit a crime; however, the x>detention must
be temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop"; (3) an officer may arrest a suspect if
the officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed.
State v. Deitman. 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987)(quoting United
States v. Merritt, 736 F.2d 223, 230 (5th Cir. 1984)(citation
omitted)).

These categories are not static.

Thus, a level one

consensual encounter can escalate into a level two seizure or a
level three arrest, or vice versa.

See United States v. Shareef,

100 F.3d 1491, 1500 (10th Cir. 1996) (explaining relationship
between levels of police-citizen encounters).

Only the second

and third levels, however, implicate the protections of the
Fourth Amendment.

See, e.g., State v. Struhs, 940 P.2d 1225,

1227 (Utah App. 1997).
In the context of a traffic stop, "[a] person is seized
under the Fourth Amendment when, considering the totality of the
circumstances, the police conduct would have communicated to a
reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the
officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter and go
about his or her business."

State v. Hiqgins, 884 P.2d 1242,

1244 (Utah 1994)(citing, inter alia, United States v. Mendenhall,
446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).

And, once an individual is seized,

for the seizure to end, it must be clear to the seized person,
either from the words of an officer or from the clear import of
8

the circumstances, that the person is at liberty to go about his
or her business.

Hiqqins, 884 P.2d at 1244 (citing United States

v, Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 540-41 (10th Cir. 1994)).
In determining whether a detainee is free to go, courts look
to several circumstances.

The return of a detained driver's

documents signals one line of demarcation.

Thus, federal courts

"have consistently concluded that an officer must return a
driver's documentation before a detention can end." United States
v. Elliot. 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing United
States v. Gregory, 79 F.3d 973, 979 (10th Cir. 1996) and United
States v. Werkina, 915 F.2d 1404, 1404 (10th Cir. 1990)).

That

action, however, will not necessarily render any subsequent
interchange consensual "if the driver has objectively reasonable
cause to believe that he or she is not free to leave."

Shareef,

100 F.3d at 1501 (citing United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956,
959 (10th Cir.), cert, denied 502 U.S. 881 (1991)); accord
Elliot, 107 F.3d at 814 (and cases cited therein).
In evaluating the objective reasonableness of the
circumstances facing a detainee, courts look especially to the
conduct of the police towards the detainee:
Examples of circumstances that might indicate
a seizure, even where the person did not
attempt to leave, would be the threatening
presence of several officers, the display of
a weapon by an officer, some physical
touching of the person of the citizen, or the
use of language or tone of voice indicating
that compliance with the officer's request
9

might be compelled.
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted);
accord State v. Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1064 (10th Cir. 1997);
Turner, 928 F.2d at 959.
Notably, however, the police need not explicitly tell the
detainee that he or she is free to go in order for a seizure to
de-escalate into a consensual encounter.
U.S. 33, 36 (1996).

Ohio v. Robinette, 519

Thus, in Robinette, an officer stopped

defendant along an interstate highway for speeding, asked him for
his driver's license and registration, and ran a computer check.
The check came back clear.
get out of his vehicle.

The officer then asked defendant to

Defendant did so.

The officer turned on

his mounted video camera, issued a verbal warning to defendant,
and returned his license.

Id. at 35. With the video camera

still running, the officer then asked, "One question before you
get gone: [A]re you carrying any illegal contraband in your car?
Any weapons of any kind, drugs, anything like that?"

Defendant

answered "no" and then, subsequently, in response to the
officer's request, gave permission to search the car, in which
the officer found marijuana.

Id. at 35-36.

Under these factual circumstances, the Court upheld the
voluntariness of defendant's consent, opining that "it would be
unrealistic to require police officers to always inform detainees
that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed

10

voluntary."

Id. at 40.

Thus, Robinette rejects a bright-line

rule that a detention pursuant to a traffic stop cannot become
consensual until an officer has explicitly told a detainee he is
free to leave.
An objective look at the totality of the circumstances here
compels the conclusion that defendant was objectively free to go
even though, as in Robinette, the officer did not explicitly so
inform him.

Officer Salas had issued a warning to defendant and

had returned all of defendant's personal papers to him, just as
in Robinette.

In Robinette, however, several other indicia of

police control remained that are notably absent in this case.
First, the officer had asked Robinette to get out of his car,
thus separating him from his means of freely leaving the scene
(Id. at 35). Second, the officer turned on his video camera,
thus reasonably indicating to Robinette that he was the focus of
the ongoing recorded encounter (Id.).

And, finally, the officer

prefaced his question with the phrase, "One question before you
get gone/' whose meaning may reasonably be interpreted as: "I
need to ask you one question before you are free to go" (Id.).
In contrast to Robinette, here Officer Salas requested that
defendant get back in his car, thus specifically restoring
defendant to his means of leaving the scene (R. 39: 5). Further,
Officer Salas neither activated a video recorder nor prefaced his
additional questions with any verbiage implying that defendant
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had to remain on the scene.
In addition, only a single officer was present.

The record

reveals no evidence that Officer Salas touched defendant, used a
weapon in any way at all, spoke in an intimidating tone of voice,
or otherwise engaged in a * coercive show of authority7' that would
provide defendant with objectively reasonable grounds to believe
he was not free to go.

See, e.g.,

Turner, 928 F.2d at 959.

The record unequivocally demonstrates that Officer Salas
issued a warning citation and returned all of defendant's
documentation without any coercive show of authority.

At that

point, the purpose of the original detention was fulfilled and
the seizure, for Fourth Amendment purposes, ended.

Contrary to

defendant's assertions, then, the scope of the detention in this
case remained within constitutional bounds.

The subsequent

interchange between defendant and the officer, consensual as a
matter of law, accordingly does not implicate the Fourth
Amendment.
POINT TWO
BECAUSE DEFENDANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH OF
HIS VEHICLE DURING A VOLUNTARY POLICE-CITIZEN
ENCOUNTER, HIS ATTENUATION ANALYSIS IS
INAPPOSITE
The crux of defendant's argument is that his consent to
search was the product of an illegal detention.

Absent

attenuation from that illegality, he contends, his consent was
invalid and the nine pounds of marijuana seized as the fruit of
12

the consent should be suppressed.

See Br. of App. at 14-16.

Defendant's argument is based on the rule of law that a
consent to search, if obtained through police exploitation of a
prior illegality, will only be valid if it is sufficiently
attenuated from the preceding unlawful conduct.
v. Arrovo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990).

See, e.g., State

Defendant's argument

fails because he premises it on the notion that he was unlawfully
detained at the time he gave his consent to search.
App. at 15.

See Br. of

Defendant does not dispute the voluntariness of his

consent, arguing only that the evidence against him was obtained
by exploiting a prior illegality.

See Br. of App. at 6, 14.

As has been explained in Point One, the seizure, properly
analyzed for Fourth Amendment purposes, objectively de-escalated
into a consensual police-citizen encounter after Officer Salas
issued the warning citation to defendant and returned his
documentation.

At that juncture, defendant was free to go.

It

is undisputed that the officer requested consent to search after
these two events had occurred.

Consequently, because there was

no police illegality, there was nothing from which to attenuate
defendant's consent.

For this reason, defendant's attenuation

argument is inapposite.

13

CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm the trial
court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this \fj>day

of January, 2000.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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Addendum A
Ruling on Motion to Suppress

THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FUK GRAND COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs

RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS
Case No.

ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
Defendant.

9917-34

Judge Lyle R. Anderson

The critical question in this case is whether the police
officer violated defendants1 rights by inquiring about
defendants travel plans.

There is case authority supporting the

proposition that the police may not expand the scope of a stop
without reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity.

It

also seems to be accepted in other cases that the police do not
violate an individuals rights by engaging in routine
conversation.
From the evidence presented in this case, it appears that
the officer gained some information before checking the drivers
license.

This information was gained in the course of routine

friendly conversation between the driver and the officer, which
the law does not prohibit.

The conversation after checking the

1

THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

driver's license was not routine and would be permitted only if
information gathered to that point gave rise to a reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.
1.

At that point, the officer knew:

The driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car
in Nevada.

2.

The driver said he sold Microsoft computers.

Microsoft

does not manufacture computers.
3.

There were white velvet bags on the front mirror and
the rear dash.

4.

There was a strong fragrance of perfume or air
freshener.

This court believes it was reasonable to suspect something
amiss under these circumstances.

Accordingly, the officer was

entitled to delay the driver to ask a few more questions.

The

answers to those questions did not allay the suspicion, but

1

Someone who actually sells computers could possibly answer this question in this
way, meaning "computers that run on Microsoft software, as opposed to Apple." However,
most salesmen would either name their manufacturer or say "IBM compatible".

2

THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

heightened it slightly.

The officer then appropriately asked for

consent to search, which he received.
The motion to suppress is denied.
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THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR
CASE NUMBER 9917-34
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS

COURT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF MAILING/HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the

day of July, 1999, I

mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS to the
following:
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